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Why Philosophy of History Thrives in Times of Crisis
	 	 herman	paul
The philosophy of history is unlikely to disappear in a world beset by crises. 
Crises, understood as anomalies in how people conceive of their past-present 
relationships, serve as impetuses rather than as obstacles to philosophy of 
history. The more societies wonder whether economic growth is endless, or 
whether children in the West will ever reach the prosperity levels of their parents 
or how growing burdens of public debt will affect the ‘social contract between 
the generations’, the more likely they are to rethink their inherited past-present 
relationships. In a sense then, philosophy is a crisis phenomenon: the genre thrives 
in times of uncertainty. This does not imply that philosophy of history will always 
be taught in academic history departments: the genre has often, not to say usually, 
been practiced by non-historians. Historians might want to consider though, how 
well they serve their societies if they allow the philosophy of history to be practiced 
without the critical checks and balances of professional historiography.
If periods of happiness are the blank pages of history, as G.W.F. Hegel 
famously said1, then philosophy of history languishes especially in times of 
peace and calm. Philosophy of history, that notorious branch of reflection 
on how human beings relate to their past, is a crisis phenomenon. At times 
when history seems to develop in accordance with what people hope or 
expect, typically it attracts little attention. Yet as soon as newspaper headlines 
proclaim ‘crises’ – that is, anomalies in a society’s horizons of expectation, or 
occurrences that do not fit within existing views of past, present and future – 
philosophy of history grows in importance, often even capturing the attention 
of non-academic audiences.
 Take Giambattista Vico, the Neapolitan schoolmaster, or Juan Andrés, 
the Spanish Jesuit, both of whom are known as early historicist philosophers 
of history. Their insistence on the distinct historical identity of every European 
nation was not simply an anticipation of Leopold von Ranke’s dictum that 
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every period is immediate to God, but a battle cry from the subaltern margins 
of eighteenth-century Europe, directed against the view that European 
civilization had travelled northwards and culminated in French classicism. 
Eighteenth-century historicism was a protest against unilineal theories of 
cultural evolution that relegated non-French territory to Europe’s prehistory.
 Another instance is Johann Gustav Droysen, one of the towering figures 
beside Hegel in nineteenth-century philosophy of history, who wrote his 
Grundriss der Historik in a time that he perceived as one grappling with crises: 
Everything is shaken, everything is undergoing immeasurable disruption, 
agitation, brutalisation. All the old things are worn out, falsified, consumed by 
worms and irretrievable. And the new is still without form and end, chaotic, 
merely destructive.2 
Droysen’s philosophy of history was an extended reflection on the didactic 
functions of historical thinking in an age when such upheavals as the 1848 
revolutions rendered old certainties uncertain.
 To what extent experiences of crisis and feelings of loss were animating 
forces behind the sort of reflection conventionally known as philosophy of 
history is even more clearly visible in what was arguably the heyday of the 
genre – the 1920s and 1930s. Apart from Oswald Spengler’s Untergang des 
Abendlandes, the title of which was on the lips of an entire generation, Ernst 
Troeltsch’s wrestling with the so-called crisis of historicism illustrated 
that philosophy of history was, in his own words, ‘not merely a scholarly 
problem, but a practical life problem’.3 Legend has it that Troeltsch once left a 
conference, slamming doors, after having treated his audience to a diagnosis 
of the times that was as brief as it was alarming: ‘Gentlemen, everything is 
tottering’!4 Even if this anecdote is apocryphal, the fact that it circulated 
widely among Troeltsch’s students and commentators suggests that it 
somehow captured the anxieties associated with Troeltsch’s philosophy of 
history.
1 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Geschichte, Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus 
Michel (eds.) (Frankfurt am Main 1970) 42.
2 J.G. Droysen, ‘Zur Charakteristik der europäischen 
Krisis’, in: idem, Politische Schriften, Felix Gilbert 
(ed.) (Munich 1933) 328. All translations are mine.
3 Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Die Krisis des Historismus’, Die 
Neue Rundschau 33 (1922) 586.
4 Trutz Rendtorff, ‘Einleitung’, in: Ernst Troeltsch, 
Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die 
Religionsgeschichte (1902/1912) mit den Thesen von 
1901 und den handschriftlichen Zusätzen, Trutz 















There is, admittedly, no lack of counter examples. Henry Thomas Buckle, 
whose name in late Victorian England was almost synonymous with the 
philosophy of history, was more self-assured in tracing the laws of historical 
evolution. Similarly, when Albert Maria Weiss, a now forgotten Swiss 
philosopher, envied ‘the few rarefied minds whom it has been given to make 
the most beautiful theme that a human pen can work on, a philosophy of 
history, the subject of their thought’5, he demonstrated that there have been 
thinkers, blessed with greater tranquillity than Vico, Droysen, and Troeltsch, 
for whom philosophy of history was not a tormented search for redefinition of 
problematic past-present relationships but a confirmation of the comforting 
illusion that history was on their side. 
 Nonetheless, in most cases, the philosophy of history has attracted 
scholarly attention because there was a broadly felt need for rethinking 
inherited past-present relationships (that is, inherited modes of studying, 
interpreting, representing or otherwise relating to the past). When in the mid-
twentieth century philosophers of history devoted one book after another to ‘the 
meaning of history’, they did so because the grand historical visions of Buckle 
and Weiss had been shattered into pieces, leaving societies to wonder in which 
direction, if any, history was heading. And in our day one of the most hotly-
debated issues in philosophy of history is the perceived lack of meaning in what 
seems the negative defining moment of European identity – the Holocaust.
 It is also no coincidence that Hayden White, whose work revolves around 
a desire to liberate human beings from oppressive traditions6, is nowadays most 
widely read in Eastern Europe, Latin America and China. A leading journal in 
the field, History and Theory, recently declared that these regions display a far 
greater interest in the philosophy of history than North America and Western 
Europe (so that the journal now finds itself cooperating with the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences instead of with the American Historical Association).7
 In short, it seems that philosophy of history thrives in times of crisis, 
or more precisely, in spatio-temporal contexts of uncertainty about the 
plausibility of inherited past-present relationships (i.e., inherited modes 
of making sense of the past). While there is often no perceived need for 
philosophy of history as long as conventional past-present relationships 
suffice, the genre attracts intense interest as soon as history changes from 
beautiful into sublime (that is, from an answer into a question, or from 
predictable into adventurous or threatening).
5 Quoted in Emil Spiess, Die Grundfragen der 
Geschichtsphilosophie (Schwyz 1937) 5.
6 As I argue in Herman Paul, Hayden White: The 
Historical Imagination (Cambridge 2011).
7 Ethan Kleinberg and Brian Fay, ‘History and 
Theory: Expanding the Intellectual Network’, 




8 Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London 
1957) v.
Speculative philosophy of history
Is it pertinent however to speak about the philosophy of history as a genre, 
in the singular? I can imagine that some readers are reminded of Karl Popper 
and William Walsh, two mid-twentieth-century philosophers who sharply 
distinguished between two genres – ‘speculative’ and ‘critical’ philosophy 
of history. As the nomenclature already indicates, speculative philosophy of 
history, as represented by such system builders as Hegel and Spengler, was 
considered inappropriate because there seemed to be no scientific means for 
corroborating or falsifying theories about the goal, meaning or nature of the 
historical process. This criticism of speculative philosophy of history has been 
so influential that quite a few of those currently known as philosophers of 
history still equate their field with what Popper and Walsh identified as the 
proper, ‘scientific’ realm of critical philosophy of history.
 Against this background then, one may object that what I said 
about philosophy of history as a crisis phenomenon might well apply to the 
speculative branch – to Karl Marx’s dialectics, to Troeltsch’s historicism or 
to Francis Fukuyama’s meditations on ‘the end of history’ – but not to what 
philosophers of history since Popper and Walsh have come to recognise as their 
true business: philosophical analysis of the language, concepts and methods 
that historians employ.
 However this objection overlooks the extent to which Walsh’s and 
Popper’s distinction itself was a crisis phenomenon. Popper dedicated The 
Poverty of Historicism to ‘the countless men and women of all creeds or nations or 
races who fell victims to the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable Laws 
of Historical Destiny’.8 These words leave no doubt that Popper’s aversion 
to evolutionary laws stemmed, at least in part, from a desire to help prevent 
a second Third Reich. In a similar vein, nineteenth-century Historismus came 
under attack, not merely because of its perceived epistemological weaknesses 
but also and often especially because of its supposed anti-liberal leanings.
 I am therefore inclined to consider both the gallons of ink spent in the 
battle against speculative philosophy of history as well as the almost allergic 
aversion of Popper and his colleagues to all ‘metaphysical thinking’ as further 
illustrations of my thesis that philosophy of history is a genre (or a set of 
genres, if you want) fuelled by experiences of crisis. Not the least among the 
factors that contributed to the rise of critical philosophy of history was a desire 














Economic growth and religious decline
I emphasise all this in order to argue that philosophy of history is unlikely to 
disappear in a world beset by crises of the sort invoked by the editors in their 
introductory words. For what the foregoing suggests is that crises – anomalies 
in how people conceive of the relationships between past, present and future 
– often serve as impetuses rather than obstacles to philosophy of history. 
The more societies wonder whether economic growth is endless, or whether 
children in the West will ever reach the prosperity levels of their parents, or 
how growing burdens of public debt will affect the ‘social contract between 
the generations’, or how long North America will remain the world’s leading 
society, or to what extent secularisation is irreversible, or whether global 
warming is indeed a sword of Damocles, the more likely they are to rethink 
their inherited past-present relationships.
 It is therefore no coincidence that advocates of sustainable energy 
such as Herman Wijffels find themselves consulting ‘big history’ books (Jared 
Diamond’s Collapse, for example) in an attempt to understand why the West is 
so remarkably reluctant to address its over-dependency on natural resources. 
Neither is it coincidence that Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, 
draws on Augustinian philosophies of history in trying to counter the 
pessimistic belief that dropping church attendance in British parishes signals 
the immanent end of Christianity in the West. Economists and archbishops 
alike, venture into philosophy of history as soon as they address the limitations 
of prevailing narratives of economic growth and religious decline.
A rich array of resources
Perhaps the most interesting question then, is not whether philosophy 
of history has a future (which it certainly has), but to what extent those 
professionally employed as philosophers of history will be able to respond to a 
societal demand for rethinking inherited past-present relationships. Especially 
in such countries as the Netherlands, where philosophy of history in the past 
half a century has been institutionalised in academic history programmes to 
a degree unheard of in the rest of the world, the most urgent question might 
be to what extent philosophers of history will be prepared to help societies 
reflect on, for example, grand historical narratives that are no longer deemed 
convincing.
 As far as I can see, the successes of critical philosophy of history in the 
past sixty years both enable and hinder philosophers of history to assume 
this responsibility. On the one hand, critical philosophy of history has been 
so anxious to avoid everything vaguely resembling Marx, Hegel or Spengler 
that it has almost exclusively applied itself to the study of how historians (in 
the West) investigate the past. The catalogue of quasi-canonical problems in 
forum
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contemporary philosophy of history does not include the meaning of history 
or the dangers of historical relativism; it consists rather of such historians’ 
problems as explanation, inference, intention, context, comparison and 
model-building. Indeed, increasingly philosophy of history has become a 
philosophy of professional historiography, that is, a ‘philosophical meta-
disciplinary’ subfield not unlike philosophy of science or philosophy of 
economics.9
 While this narrow disciplinary focus might not seem particularly 
advantageous, the flip side is that decades of relative isolation have allowed 
philosophers of history to engage in fairly specialist debates over causation, 
explanation, narrative and experience (think, for example, of the controversies 
provoked by Carl Hempel’s covering law model or William Dray’s analytical 
hermeneutics). These exchanges have contributed to a considerable refinement 
of how philosophers of history understand historical interpretation, 
explanation and story-telling.
 That this investment can yield substantial profit is illustrated by 
philosophers of history who try to intervene in public debates over history 
education, cultural heritage, national identity, tradition or secularisation. 
Mark Salber Phillips, for example, draws on Hans-Georg Gadamer and 
Thomas Kuhn in advocating alternatives to ‘the simple binary of tradition 
and modernity which for so long has distracted those who have tried to 
come to grips’ with tradition, heritage and innovation in politics and art.10 
David Gross analyses how contemporary Western societies remember and 
forget their (idealised, traumatised) pasts with help of insights developed 
by Friedrich Nietzsche and Reinhart Koselleck.11 Thomas Albert Howard 
more specifically draws on Hayden White in examining the plot structures 
of such secularisation narratives as told in Charles Taylor’s The Secular Age.12 
Closer to hand, Rik Peters’s ‘learning history’ projects, carried out at Philips 
and in other corporate environments, rely on Koselleck, Quentin Skinner 
and Frank Ankersmit, among others, in elucidating the nature and effects of 
organisational management change.13
9 Aviezer Tucker, ‘Introduction’, in: idem (ed.), 
A Companion to the Philosophy of History and 
Historiography (Malden, ma 2009) 4.
10 Mark Salber Phillips, ‘What is Tradition When 
It is Not “Invented”?: A Historiographical 
Introduction’, in: Mark Salber Phillips and Gordon 
Schochet (eds.), Questions of Tradition (Toronto 
2004) 25.
11 David Gross, Lost Time: On Remembering and 
Forgetting in Late Modern Culture (Amherst 2000).
12 Thomas Albert Howard, ‘The Modern Comedy: 
Still Pondering Charles Taylor’s Secular Age’, 
The Cresset 72:3 (2009) 13-17; see also Martin 
Jay, ‘Faith-Based History’, History and Theory 48 
(2009) 76-84.
13 Luchien Karsten et al., ‘Leadership Style 
and Entrepreneurial Change: The Centurion 
Operation at Philips Electronics’, Journal of 
















Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975), one of the

















 Although not all the inspirational sources just mentioned can be neatly 
classified as critical philosophers of history, I think each of the examples 
illustrates that technical insights developed in highly specialised areas of 
philosophy of history can sometimes be fruitfully applied to non-academic 
debates about (changing) past-present relationships. The insights that Phillips, 
Gross, Howard and Peters bring to the table stem from thorough familiarity 
with discourse analysis, speech-act theory, philosophy of narrative and 
hermeneutics of action. Their examples therefore illustrate that the legacy 
of critical philosophy of history is not necessarily a negative one. Thanks 
to Hempel, Dray and others, philosophers of history now have a rich array 
of resources for helping such people as Wijffels and Williams address the 
strengths and limitations of our inherited past-present relationships.
Academic historical studies
Whether such philosophers of history will (continue to) be employed by 
academic history departments, of course, is an open question. Perhaps they 
will not: philosophy of history has often, not to say usually, been practiced by 
non-historians. Historians may want to consider though, how well they serve 
their societies if they allow philosophy of history to be practiced without the 
critical checks and balances of professional historiography. 
 Remember William Walsh, whose dislike of speculative philosophy 
of history did not prevent him from engaging with Arnold Toynbee’s work. 
Although historians are right to criticise Toynbee, said Walsh, they themselves 
are to blame for creating a vacuum in which such philosophies as Toynbee’s 
could emerge.14 Analogously, one could argue that historians are best advised 
not to leave philosophy of history to economists, climate experts and other 
citizens who feel themselves trapped in crises of various kinds – particularly 
not if these historians care about the adequacy and reliability of what is being 
said in the public domain.
 Particularly in times of crisis, historians might want to invest in 
philosophy of history and try to make the expertise that has been developed 
under the aegis of critical philosophy of history available to societies 
reorienting themselves in time and rethinking their inherited relations to the 
past.      q
14 W.H. Walsh, Philosophy of History: An Introduction 
(revision edition; New York 1967) 164-165.
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